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Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980–1997

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of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high points of the book. Obando does an especially fine job reviewing the successes and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug policies.

Addicted to Failure effectively raises several significant issues for the reader to mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug policy been a costly failure that has made the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier? Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats to the United States beyond those associated with drug trafficking? If the current policies are counterproductive, what are the correct policies? Loveman does not provide convincing answers to the first two questions and does not address the third.

At the end of the day, *Addicted to Failure* is a book that should not be disregarded. It encourages readers to plunge deeper into the complexities of South America. For while Loveman and his authors may not offer any answers, it is clear that the United States will face increasingly complex challenges from this part of the world in the years ahead.

RICHARD NORTON
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Taylor, Lewis. *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997*. Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2006. 232pp. \$32.50

In *Shining Path* Lewis Taylor provides compelling evidence that the attitude of the people can be decisive in war. That point will not surprise students of warfare; they will recall that two great strategists stressed the central importance of having the people on your side. Focusing

primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl von Clausewitz coined the notion that war's dominant tendencies make a "paradoxical trinity," of which one pole comprises primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, a blind natural force. The passions, Clausewitz wrote, "that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people." Concentrating on guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung famously wrote that "in the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops, the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish that inhabit it."

In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to understand and respect the rural population on the parts of the guerrillas (the Sendero Luminoso, or "Shining Path") led by Abimael Guzmán and of the government of Peru came close to dooming the efforts of both sides in the bloody conflict. After the end of hostilities, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that more than sixty-nine thousand Peruvians had been killed in the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the Shining Path responsible for the majority of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao made clear that the end of warfare was not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor shows how close the combatants came, through their own excesses, to defeating their own causes.

Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin American sociology at the University of Liverpool, does not adequately highlight the strategic implications of his subject. In fact, reading his book leaves unanswered the questions of why he wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses his study narrowly on the northern highlands of Peru, which were a particularly brutal locus of armed action. Although he acknowledges that generalized

violence occurred in 1992 in twenty-one of Peru's twenty-four departments, he ignores other important areas of the conflict. He also writes as though the war in Peru proceeded without an international context, except for the intellectual contribution of Mao Tse-tung. True, the Cold War had ended by the time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán, but many observers think the agents could not have succeeded without the help of outside intelligence. In addition, U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs not only disrupted a source of support to the Shining Path but also relieved economic pressure on the government of Peru when it was sorely stressed by the conflict.

The Peruvian war provides insights for the future of revolutionary movements in Latin America—in countries with elected governments and when no support will be available from a Cuba or a Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold War. Fortunately, any reader interested in those issues, as well as in a systematic treatment of the strategic lessons of two decades of conflict in Peru, can find an excellent source in Cynthia McClintock's 1998 *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*, published by the United States Institute of Peace Press.

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Matheson, Michael J. *Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. 422pp. \$19.95

When a longtime Department of State attorney and former member of the prestigious International Law Commission takes the time to recount his considerable firsthand observations of the performance of the United Nations, *Naval War College Review* readers do well to take notice. At a time when a new U.S. geographic command is being stood up in Africa and military forces find their planning and operations centers increasingly visited by coalition, interagency, international, and non-governmental organizational representatives, it is indispensable to have a clear understanding of the evolving role of the UN Security Council and its technical commissions and tribunal investigators. Matheson provides us with an insightful description, one that nicely serves that purpose.

The book is arranged in seven chapters and five appendixes. The first chapter provides a straightforward description of the UN Charter provisions that serve as the framework for action by the Security Council. It is complemented by chapter 2, which describes the council's jurisdiction and mandate as the institution charged with the "primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security." The next three chapters provide general descriptions of the three principal modalities of Security Council actions: sanctions, peacekeeping and governance, and use of force. The growing importance of UN technical commissions is then described, followed by an examination of the UN role in prosecuting international crimes. The book is well indexed and includes summaries of some of the key council resolutions and a bibliography that will prove useful to those seeking more detailed coverage.

The Communist Party of Peru (PCP) — Shining Path (Spanish: Partido Comunista del Perú — Sendero Luminoso), more commonly known as the Shining Path (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso), is a revolutionary communist party and political organization in Peru following Marxism—Leninism—Maoism and Gonzalo Thought. When it first launched during the internal conflict in Peru in 1980, its goal was to overthrow the state by guerrilla warfare and replace it with a New Democracy. The Communist Party of Peru believed that

"During the 1980s and early 1990s, Peru suffered one of the bloodiest civil wars in contemporary Latin America as the state attempted to quell the insurrection launched by the Partido Comunista del Peru-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL), commonly known as Sendero Luminoso ('Shining Path'). In this book, Lewis Taylor introduces the PCP-SL and places its activities in the context of developments in other regions of Peru and more general scholarly work on questions of rural revolt and revolution. Taylor seamlessly integrates his insights about the characteristics of the Shining Path's trajectory that are specific to the northern highlands with the nature of the movement as a whole. *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*, ed. Steven Stern (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998): 37. Ibid, 38. Ibid, 39. Ibid, 37. Carlos Iván DeGregori, "How Social Sciences Failed? How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999," (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012): 43. Ibid, 44. José Carlos Mariátegui, *The Problem of the Indian*, (1928). Lewis Taylor, "Maoism in the Andes: Shining Path: Guerilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997," (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006): 3. Ibid. Ibid, 5. Eliab El War and social life in prehispanic Peru: Ritual, defense, and communities at the fortress of Acaray, Huaura Valley. Read more. Article. This work seeks to warn the current state of the historiography on the junior sectors during the wars of independence Peru and the Río de la Plata. A comparative analysis of these spaces allows us to sustain the popular classes decisively involved in the revolutionary process, devised various alternative policies of Government and actively negotiated its intervention in the configuration of The Shining Path, once the most formidable guerrilla force in Latin America, is but a shadow of its former self. In its heyday in the 1980s, the Shining Path was the most formidable rebel movement in Latin America, waging a brutal war with the Peruvian state. Not only did the Maoist group control large areas of the countryside but it also struck at targets in the capital, Lima, prompting fears it could eventually take over the country. Some 70,000 died in the rebellion and the counter-insurgency campaign it triggered. The violence only abated after Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman was captured in 1992. Maoist movement. Guzman formed the movement in the 1970s, inspired by Mao's Cultural Revolution Summer 2008 , pp. 212-216. Lewis Taylor, *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006. Tables, figures, maps, bibliography, index, 232 pp.; hardcover \$85, paperback \$32.50. Paul Dosh (a1) and Annie Stilger Virnig (a1). (a1). Macalester College. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1531426X00009444>.

The Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path (PCP-SL) (Spanish: Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso), more commonly known as the Shining Path (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso), is a revolutionary communist party and terrorist organization in Peru following Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and Gonzalo Thought. When it launched the internal conflict in Peru in 1980, its goal was to overthrow the state by guerrilla warfare and replace it with a Maoist government. The PCP-SL believed that by establishing a War and social life in prehispanic Peru: Ritual, defense, and communities at the fortress of Acaray, Huaura Valley. Read more. Article. This work seeks to warn the current state of the historiography on the junior sectors during the wars of independence Peru and the Río de la Plata. A comparative analysis of these spaces allows us to sustain the popular classes decisively involved in the revolutionary process, devised various alternative policies of Government and actively negotiated its intervention in the configuration of 652 Peruvian Shining Path. Path's eventual victory is no longer the assured event that it once seemed to be. Guerrilla activity extended to all but two of Peru's twenty-five departments (provinces), although, except for select communities, the Shining Path never controlled much territory. At first, President Fernando Belaúnde Terry used the police forces to respond to the Shining Path's threat, but with. The Shining Path pursued a Maoist strategy of prolonged popular war that included laying siege to the city from the countryside, eventually bringing its war to poor shantytowns on Lima's periphery. By the early 1990s, car bombings of TV stations, military barracks, and banks; assaults on trucks; and the dynamiting of power lines had a real effect on the urban population.